Files
responder/tests
kennethreitz 6759c67c77 Harden JWTAuth/OAuth2Auth: close 9 security and correctness findings
A dedicated adversarial pass over the 8.1.0 auth code found nine issues,
all in responder/ext/auth.py, each now fixed with a regression test:

Security: reject plaintext http JWKS URLs (MITM key injection); cap
unknown-kid JWKS refetches behind a cache + cooldown (unauthenticated DoS);
require exp by default (require_exp=True); stop mutating/freezing OAuth2
introspection principals (privilege retention).

Correctness: a JWKS scheme sent an HS256 token no longer 500s (now 401);
audience=None actually disables aud verification (was rejecting every OIDC
token); scope and scp claims are unioned (Azure/Auth0 scp tokens no longer
403); empty OAuth2 flow URLs raise instead of emitting an invalid spec.

Every fix verified fail-before/pass-after, then re-checked by an independent
adversarial pass. Full suite green on 3.11 and 3.14.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 13:14:05 -04:00
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