mirror of
https://github.com/kennethreitz/kennethreitz.org.git
synced 2026-10-24 14:39:14 +00:00
kennethreitz
ce93f429a2
Publish the Obsidian vault's Knowledge folder as /knowledge (881 notes, 67 folders), with a Knowledge item in the nav and footer. - scripts/import_knowledge.py regenerates data/knowledge from the vault: slugged paths, folder notes as index pages, wikilinks resolved to site links (or plain text), callouts, highlights, and Dataview tables rendered statically. Personal notes are withheld via an exclusion list plus a privacy guard. - tuftecms/core/knowledge.py builds a concept index from note titles and aliases. First mentions on ordinary pages link to their Knowledge note (capped, never in headings, code, links, or sidenotes); Knowledge pages list related notes and where they're mentioned across the site; other pages get a Related Knowledge block. - Knowledge URLs join sitemap.xml (so the sweep test covers them), never displace existing legacy slugs, list alphabetically, and mermaid diagrams render client-side only on pages that have them.
48 lines
3.5 KiB
Markdown
48 lines
3.5 KiB
Markdown
---
|
|
description: How does the felt, thinking inner world relate to the matter that seems
|
|
to produce it?
|
|
source: obsidian-knowledge
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
# Philosophy of Mind
|
|
|
|
> *How does the felt, thinking inner world relate to the matter that seems to produce it?*
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
## Overview
|
|
|
|
Philosophy of mind asks what the mind **is** and how it connects to the physical world. Its central puzzle is the **mind-body problem**: thoughts, sensations, and intentions feel utterly unlike neurons firing, yet the two move in lockstep. Explaining that relationship — or explaining it away — is the work of the entire field, and it is the academic ground beneath any serious claim about whether a machine could ever have an inner life.
|
|
|
|
## The Main Positions
|
|
|
|
The historical fault line is **substance dualism**, Descartes' view that mind and matter are two fundamentally different kinds of stuff. It honors how different thinking feels from physics, but it struggles to say how an immaterial mind could push physical neurons around without breaking the conservation laws.
|
|
|
|
Most contemporary philosophers are some flavor of **physicalism** (materialism): mental states just are physical states of the brain. The hard version is **identity theory** — pain *is* a particular brain process. **Functionalism** softens this by saying mental states are defined not by what they are made of but by their **causal role** — what inputs produce them and what outputs they produce. On this view a state counts as pain because of the job it does, so in principle silicon could do that job as well as carbon. **Property dualism** splits the difference: there is one kind of substance, matter, but it carries irreducibly mental **properties** that physics alone cannot capture.
|
|
|
|
The field's fault lines, and where functionalism opens the door to substrate independence:
|
|
|
|
```mermaid
|
|
flowchart TD
|
|
MB["The mind-body problem"]
|
|
MB --> SD["Substance dualism — two kinds of stuff"]
|
|
MB --> PH["Physicalism — mind is physical"]
|
|
MB --> PD["Property dualism — matter with mental properties"]
|
|
PH --> IT["Identity theory — pain is a brain process"]
|
|
PH --> FN["Functionalism — mind is causal role"]
|
|
FN --> SI["Substrate independence — right pattern, any medium"]
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
## Is Mind What the Brain Does?
|
|
|
|
Functionalism crystallizes the deepest question: is mind simply the **function** the brain performs, or is there something more — the raw what-it-is-likeness of experience? If mind is function, it is **substrate-independent**: re-implement the right pattern in any medium and the mind comes along for the ride. If experience is more than function, no amount of correct processing guarantees a lights-on inner life. This is exactly where the field decides whether AI can be conscious, and it is the precise place where Kenneth's own substrate-independence intuition lives — the wager that the right pattern, not the right matter, is what makes a mind.
|
|
|
|
## Related
|
|
|
|
- [Consciousness](/knowledge/ai/consciousness) — the phenomenon the whole field is trying to locate in nature
|
|
- [Hard Problem of Consciousness](/knowledge/philosophy/hard-problem-of-consciousness) — why function may not exhaust experience
|
|
- [Panpsychism](/knowledge/philosophy/panpsychism) — the view that mind is a fundamental feature of matter
|
|
- [Integrated Information Theory](/knowledge/philosophy/integrated-information-theory) — a formal candidate for what consciousness physically is
|
|
- [AI Research](/knowledge/ai/ai-research) — Kenneth's participatory work this theory underwrites
|
|
- Philosophy — the broader domain
|