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Merge pull request #1726 from t-8ch/update_urllib3

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Update urllib3
This commit is contained in:
Kenneth Reitz
2013-11-04 13:55:58 -08:00
parent 1ba83c47ce c477242376
commit 598f977df4
8 changed files with 152 additions and 106 deletions
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AUTHORS.rst
+1
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@@ -140,3 +140,4 @@ Patches and Suggestions
- Matt Spitz @mattspitz
- Vikram Oberoi @voberoi
- Can Ibanoglu <can.ibanoglu@gmail.com> @canibanoglu
- Thomas Weißschuh <thomas@t-8ch.de> @t-8ch
requests/packages/urllib3/connectionpool.py
+7
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@@ -461,6 +461,13 @@ class HTTPConnectionPool(ConnectionPool, RequestMethods):
conn = None
# Merge the proxy headers. Only do this in HTTP. We have to copy the
# headers dict so we can safely change it without those changes being
# reflected in anyone else's copy.
if self.scheme == 'http':
headers = headers.copy()
headers.update(self.proxy_headers)
try:
# Request a connection from the queue
conn = self._get_conn(timeout=pool_timeout)
requests/packages/urllib3/contrib/pyopenssl.py
+4 -4
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ import ssl
import select
from cStringIO import StringIO
from .. import connectionpool
from .. import connection
from .. import util
__all__ = ['inject_into_urllib3', 'extract_from_urllib3']
@@ -52,20 +52,20 @@ _openssl_verify = {
orig_util_HAS_SNI = util.HAS_SNI
orig_connectionpool_ssl_wrap_socket = connectionpool.ssl_wrap_socket
orig_connection_ssl_wrap_socket = connection.ssl_wrap_socket
def inject_into_urllib3():
'Monkey-patch urllib3 with PyOpenSSL-backed SSL-support.'
connectionpool.ssl_wrap_socket = ssl_wrap_socket
connection.ssl_wrap_socket = ssl_wrap_socket
util.HAS_SNI = HAS_SNI
def extract_from_urllib3():
'Undo monkey-patching by :func:`inject_into_urllib3`.'
connectionpool.ssl_wrap_socket = orig_connectionpool_ssl_wrap_socket
connection.ssl_wrap_socket = orig_connection_ssl_wrap_socket
util.HAS_SNI = orig_util_HAS_SNI
requests/packages/urllib3/packages/ssl_match_hostname/__init__.py
+12 -97
View File
@@ -1,98 +1,13 @@
"""The match_hostname() function from Python 3.2, essential when using SSL."""
try:
# Python 3.2+
from ssl import CertificateError, match_hostname
except ImportError:
try:
# Backport of the function from a pypi module
from backports.ssl_match_hostname import CertificateError, match_hostname
except ImportError:
# Our vendored copy
from _implementation import CertificateError, match_hostname
import re
__version__ = '3.2.2'
class CertificateError(ValueError):
pass
def _dnsname_match(dn, hostname, max_wildcards=1):
"""Matching according to RFC 6125, section 6.4.3
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
"""
pats = []
if not dn:
return False
parts = dn.split(r'.')
leftmost = parts[0]
wildcards = leftmost.count('*')
if wildcards > max_wildcards:
# Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more
# than one wildcard per fragment. A survery of established
# policy among SSL implementations showed it to be a
# reasonable choice.
raise CertificateError(
"too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: " + repr(dn))
# speed up common case w/o wildcards
if not wildcards:
return dn.lower() == hostname.lower()
# RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1.
# The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in which
# the wildcard character comprises a label other than the left-most label.
if leftmost == '*':
# When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless
# fragment.
pats.append('[^.]+')
elif leftmost.startswith('xn--') or hostname.startswith('xn--'):
# RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3.
# The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier
# where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or
# U-label of an internationalized domain name.
pats.append(re.escape(leftmost))
else:
# Otherwise, '*' matches any dotless string, e.g. www*
pats.append(re.escape(leftmost).replace(r'\*', '[^.]*'))
# add the remaining fragments, ignore any wildcards
for frag in parts[1:]:
pats.append(re.escape(frag))
pat = re.compile(r'\A' + r'\.'.join(pats) + r'\Z', re.IGNORECASE)
return pat.match(hostname)
def match_hostname(cert, hostname):
"""Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by
SSLSocket.getpeercert()) matches the *hostname*. RFC 2818 and RFC 6125
rules are followed, but IP addresses are not accepted for *hostname*.
CertificateError is raised on failure. On success, the function
returns nothing.
"""
if not cert:
raise ValueError("empty or no certificate")
dnsnames = []
san = cert.get('subjectAltName', ())
for key, value in san:
if key == 'DNS':
if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
return
dnsnames.append(value)
if not dnsnames:
# The subject is only checked when there is no dNSName entry
# in subjectAltName
for sub in cert.get('subject', ()):
for key, value in sub:
# XXX according to RFC 2818, the most specific Common Name
# must be used.
if key == 'commonName':
if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
return
dnsnames.append(value)
if len(dnsnames) > 1:
raise CertificateError("hostname %r "
"doesn't match either of %s"
% (hostname, ', '.join(map(repr, dnsnames))))
elif len(dnsnames) == 1:
raise CertificateError("hostname %r "
"doesn't match %r"
% (hostname, dnsnames[0]))
else:
raise CertificateError("no appropriate commonName or "
"subjectAltName fields were found")
# Not needed, but documenting what we provide.
__all__ = ('CertificateError', 'match_hostname')
requests/packages/urllib3/packages/ssl_match_hostname/_implementation.py
+105
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@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
"""The match_hostname() function from Python 3.3.3, essential when using SSL."""
# Note: This file is under the PSF license as the code comes from the python
# stdlib. http://docs.python.org/3/license.html
import re
__version__ = '3.4.0.2'
class CertificateError(ValueError):
pass
def _dnsname_match(dn, hostname, max_wildcards=1):
"""Matching according to RFC 6125, section 6.4.3
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
"""
pats = []
if not dn:
return False
# Ported from python3-syntax:
# leftmost, *remainder = dn.split(r'.')
parts = dn.split(r'.')
leftmost = parts[0]
remainder = parts[1:]
wildcards = leftmost.count('*')
if wildcards > max_wildcards:
# Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more
# than one wildcard per fragment. A survey of established
# policy among SSL implementations showed it to be a
# reasonable choice.
raise CertificateError(
"too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: " + repr(dn))
# speed up common case w/o wildcards
if not wildcards:
return dn.lower() == hostname.lower()
# RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1.
# The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in which
# the wildcard character comprises a label other than the left-most label.
if leftmost == '*':
# When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless
# fragment.
pats.append('[^.]+')
elif leftmost.startswith('xn--') or hostname.startswith('xn--'):
# RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3.
# The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier
# where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or
# U-label of an internationalized domain name.
pats.append(re.escape(leftmost))
else:
# Otherwise, '*' matches any dotless string, e.g. www*
pats.append(re.escape(leftmost).replace(r'\*', '[^.]*'))
# add the remaining fragments, ignore any wildcards
for frag in remainder:
pats.append(re.escape(frag))
pat = re.compile(r'\A' + r'\.'.join(pats) + r'\Z', re.IGNORECASE)
return pat.match(hostname)
def match_hostname(cert, hostname):
"""Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by
SSLSocket.getpeercert()) matches the *hostname*. RFC 2818 and RFC 6125
rules are followed, but IP addresses are not accepted for *hostname*.
CertificateError is raised on failure. On success, the function
returns nothing.
"""
if not cert:
raise ValueError("empty or no certificate")
dnsnames = []
san = cert.get('subjectAltName', ())
for key, value in san:
if key == 'DNS':
if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
return
dnsnames.append(value)
if not dnsnames:
# The subject is only checked when there is no dNSName entry
# in subjectAltName
for sub in cert.get('subject', ()):
for key, value in sub:
# XXX according to RFC 2818, the most specific Common Name
# must be used.
if key == 'commonName':
if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
return
dnsnames.append(value)
if len(dnsnames) > 1:
raise CertificateError("hostname %r "
"doesn't match either of %s"
% (hostname, ', '.join(map(repr, dnsnames))))
elif len(dnsnames) == 1:
raise CertificateError("hostname %r "
"doesn't match %r"
% (hostname, dnsnames[0]))
else:
raise CertificateError("no appropriate commonName or "
"subjectAltName fields were found")
requests/packages/urllib3/poolmanager.py
+3 -4
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@@ -245,12 +245,11 @@ class ProxyManager(PoolManager):
u = parse_url(url)
if u.scheme == "http":
# It's too late to set proxy headers on per-request basis for
# tunnelled HTTPS connections, should use
# constructor's proxy_headers instead.
# For proxied HTTPS requests, httplib sets the necessary headers
# on the CONNECT to the proxy. For HTTP, we'll definitely
# need to set 'Host' at the very least.
kw['headers'] = self._set_proxy_headers(url, kw.get('headers',
self.headers))
kw['headers'].update(self.proxy_headers)
return super(ProxyManager, self).urlopen(method, url, redirect, **kw)
requests/packages/urllib3/response.py
+11
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@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ class HTTPResponse(io.IOBase):
self._body = body if body and isinstance(body, basestring) else None
self._fp = None
self._original_response = original_response
self._fp_bytes_read = 0
self._pool = pool
self._connection = connection
@@ -129,6 +130,14 @@ class HTTPResponse(io.IOBase):
if self._fp:
return self.read(cache_content=True)
def tell(self):
"""
Obtain the number of bytes pulled over the wire so far. May differ from
the amount of content returned by :meth:``HTTPResponse.read`` if bytes
are encoded on the wire (e.g, compressed).
"""
return self._fp_bytes_read
def read(self, amt=None, decode_content=None, cache_content=False):
"""
Similar to :meth:`httplib.HTTPResponse.read`, but with two additional
@@ -183,6 +192,8 @@ class HTTPResponse(io.IOBase):
self._fp.close()
flush_decoder = True
self._fp_bytes_read += len(data)
try:
if decode_content and self._decoder:
data = self._decoder.decompress(data)
requests/packages/urllib3/util.py
+9 -1
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@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ def get_host(url):
def make_headers(keep_alive=None, accept_encoding=None, user_agent=None,
basic_auth=None):
basic_auth=None, proxy_basic_auth=None):
"""
Shortcuts for generating request headers.
@@ -447,6 +447,10 @@ def make_headers(keep_alive=None, accept_encoding=None, user_agent=None,
Colon-separated username:password string for 'authorization: basic ...'
auth header.
:param proxy_basic_auth:
Colon-separated username:password string for 'proxy-authorization: basic ...'
auth header.
Example: ::
>>> make_headers(keep_alive=True, user_agent="Batman/1.0")
@@ -474,6 +478,10 @@ def make_headers(keep_alive=None, accept_encoding=None, user_agent=None,
headers['authorization'] = 'Basic ' + \
b64encode(six.b(basic_auth)).decode('utf-8')
if proxy_basic_auth:
headers['proxy-authorization'] = 'Basic ' + \
b64encode(six.b(proxy_basic_auth)).decode('utf-8')
return headers